Self-defense
- I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.
Author: | Shaun GallagherGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-68096 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01612 |
Parent Title (English): | Frontiers in psychology |
Subtitle (English): | deflecting deflationary and eliminativist critiques of the sense of ownership |
Publisher: | Frontiers Research Foundation |
Place of publication: | Lausanne |
Document Type: | Article |
Language: | English |
Date of Publication (online): | 2019/12/10 |
Date of first Publication: | 2017/09/21 |
Publishing Institution: | Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek |
Tag: | deflationary account; mineness; minimal self; phenomenology; sense of agency; sense of ownership |
Volume: | 8 |
First Page: | 1612-1 |
Last Page: | 1612-10 |
Institutes/Facilities: | Institut für Philosophie II |
open_access (DINI-Set): | open_access |
faculties: | Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft |
Licence (English): | Creative Commons - CC BY 4.0 - Attribution 4.0 International |