Pain experiences and their link to action

  • According to pure imperativism, pain experiences are experiences of a specific phenomenal type that are entirely constituted by imperative content. As their primary argument, proponents of imperativism rely on the biological role that pain experiences fulfil, namely, the motivation of actions whose execution ensures the normal functioning of the body. In this paper, I investigate which specific types of action are of relevance for an imperative interpretation and how close their link to pain experiences actually is. I argue that, although imperative theories constitute an apparently promising version of strong intentionalism, they cannot provide an imperative content that meets their own criteria of sufficiency and necessity. I further argue that this issue cannot be solved by impure imperative theories either.

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Metadaten
Author:Sabrina ConinxORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-89820
DOI:https://doi.org/10.13154/294-8982
Parent Title (English):Journal of consciousness studies
Subtitle (English):challenging imperative theories
Publisher:Imprint Academic
Place of publication:Exeter
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2022/05/24
Date of first Publication:2020/01/01
Publishing Institution:Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek
Volume:27
Issue:9-10
First Page:104
Last Page:126
Note:
Original-Artikel erschienen:
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 27, Numbers 9-10, 2020, pp. 104-126(23). 01.01.2020 https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2020/00000027/f0020009/art00005#
Institutes/Facilities:Institut für Philosophie II
Dewey Decimal Classification:Philosophie und Psychologie / Philosophie
Licence (German):License LogoKeine Creative Commons Lizenz - es gelten die Rechteeinräumung und das deutsche Urheberrecht